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Abstract 
Online shoppers are targeted by many scams.  To date, user education on phishing has tried to persuade them to check URLs and 
a number of other indicators, with limited success.  We evaluated a novel anti-phishing tool in a realistic setting -participants had 
to buy tickets under time pressure, and lost money if they bought from bad sites.  While none of our participants bought from 
sites the tool clearly identified as bad, 40% of participants risked money with sites flagged as potentially risky, but offering 
“bargains”.  The analysis of post-session interviews with participants revealed that - when tempted by a “good deal”, they did 
not focus on the warnings. Rather, they looked for signs they thought confirm a site‟s trustworthiness: familiar designs or 
brands, trust seals, ads, reference to social networking sites and professional-looking design were mentioned as reliable 
indicators of a legitimate site.  We argue that user education needs to focus on challenging and correcting the misconceptions 
that guide current user behavior, and present an outline such an approach. 
1 The Phishing Problem 
Phishing – tricking computer users to disclose personal 
information, credit card details, usernames and passwords - 
has been a major problem for the past 15 years. The 
probability of an online shopper coming across a phishing 
website is alarmingly high, since many show up as results 
in popular web search engines.  In a recent UK police 
operation, 7 out of the top 10 Google results for a popular 
brand of boots were found to be fraudulent websites1.  In 
addition, 1 in 12 buyers of tickets for events reported 
having been caught out by a scam ticket website, with the 
average loss for each victim being £80. Most sites are 
taken down quickly once identified, but new ones are 
springing up every day, making the process of identifying 
and closing all of them impossible. 
 
The disclosure of financial details to scam sites can not 
only lead to immediate monetary losses, but identity theft 
and its consequences (damage to a person‟s credit rating, 
or being linked with illegal activities conducted using their 
credentials). Even though some banks cover customers 
who had their credit card details stolen, this is unlikely to 
be a sustainable solution.  These problems can lead to an 
overall loss of trust in online shopping, and deter 
consumers from engaging in any online financial 
transactions. 
 
2 User Education about Phishing 
Two major approaches have been used to protect users 
against phishing: Anti-Phishing Indicators and User 
Education.  Dhamija et al. [1] explain that the first 
approach is ineffective because passive indicators are 
                                                 
 
1
Operation Papworth highlights the UGGly side of Google: 
http://www.browsermedia.co.uk/2009/12/08/operation-papworth-
highlights-the-uggly-side-of-google/ 
ignored by a significant percentage of users.  Even when 
users notice the indicators, they often do not understand 
what they signify, and the inconsistent positioning on 
different web browsers makes the task of identifying a 
phishing site difficult.  Schechter et al. [12] report that 53% 
of their participants still attempted to log into a site after 
their task was interrupted by a strong security warning.  In 
the same study, removing the HTTPS indicator had no 
effect on the willingness of participants to enter their 
personal details in a site and removing site authentication 
images resulted to 97% of participants entering their 
personal details. The findings of both papers allow us to 
conclude that any technical anti-phishing measures need to 
be complemented with effective user education to improve 
on users‟ ability to detect phishing sites. 
 
Significant effort has been put into user education, both by 
governmental organizations and academic institutions. To 
improve on the understanding of security by the public, the 
US Computer Emergency Readiness Team offers “advice 
about common security issues for non-technical computer 
users” on its site (http://www.us-
cert.gov/cas/tips/).Kumaraguru et al. [7] developed the 
PhishGuru training system to teach users how to identify 
phishing attacks.  The system sends out simulated phishing 
emails and delivers training messages when users click on 
the URLs included in those.  Its effectiveness was tested 
with 515 participants; 28 days after the first email and, 
despite being given training more than once, 17.5% of 
participants still entered personal details into simulated 
phishing websites. This was a significant improvement 
from the 40.1% a control condition revealed on day 0, but 
still leaves 1 in 5users vulnerable. The same research group 
developed Anti-phishing Phil[13], an online game to teach 
users not to fall for phishing by explaining how to identify 
phishing URLs, where to look for cues in web browsers, 
and how to use search engines to find legitimate sites.   
They report improved user ability to detect phishing 
websites after receiving training: the false positive rate 
(phishing site identified as real) was reduced from 30% to 
14%, and the false negative (non-phishing site identified as 
spoof) was reduced from 34% to 17%. Despite those 
reductions, adding the two percentages together indicates 
that 31% of users are still not able to tell the difference 
between a good and a bad site. 
 
Herley [4] argues that teaching users to check URLs is the 
wrong strategy because even diligent application of what is 
being taught offers users only limited protection against 
phishing. In his view, the effort/benefit ratio means they 
should ignore this advice, especially if the actual risk of 
financial losses is low. 
 
Another reason why current education and training efforts 
may not be effective is because they assume that users are 
keen to avoid risks, and thus likely to adopt behaviors that 
may protect them. But in reality, most online shoppers are 
looking for good deals.  They start from a search engine 
and are presented with links to various websites that 
present – often very tempting - offers.  The opportunity to 
save a significant amount of money on something they 
need, or acquire something they might normally not be 
able to afford, makes users vulnerable.  Stajano& Wilson 
[14] identify this as the Need and Greed principle that 
scammers exploit successfully: once scammers know what 
users want, they can easily manipulate them.  To address 
this problem the UK Office of Fair Trading 
(http://www.oft.gov.uk) launched campaigns aiming to 
increase consumer awareness of fake shopping websites. 
The slogan “If it sounds too good to be true, then it 
probably is” appears here, and regularly in 
communications by law enforcement officers – so far with 
little success. 
 
In line with Herley [4], we argue that current security 
education on phishing ([7] [13]) offers little protection to 
users who assess a potentially malicious site in this frame 
of mind.  Security education needs to know what drives 
user behavior in this situation – what cues they are looking 
for, and how they interpret them.  Successful security 
awareness, education and training has to do more than 
warn users of dangers – it has to target the misconceptions 
that underlie user actions.  Whilst the results presented here 
focus on phishing, a shift in perspective could help to 
develop more effective security awareness, education and 
training in other areas of computer security. 
 
3 Trust Cues in Online Transactions 
Users shopping online face a situation of risk and 
uncertainty: they have to provide payment details and 
personal information to websites, and cannot be certain 
they will receive the goods they expect in return.  Many 
online shoppers will take risks to gain benefits, and they 
look for trust cues to reduce the degree of uncertainty 
about the outcome – a trustworthy transaction partner is 
more likely to deliver.  Riegelsberger et al. [9] developed a 
framework of trust signals that both transaction partners 
can emit, focusing on ways of incentivizing trustworthy 
behavior in transaction partners, but also incorporating 
signals that can be used to assess trustworthiness, such as 
“professionalism” of a site (e.g. absence of technical 
failures, breadth of product palette and usability) and social 
embeddedness (e.g. a retailers reputation amongst friends 
and relatives of a consumer).Combined with Kim et al.‟s 
[5] findings that consumer trust directly and indirectly 
affects purchasing intentions, we can assume that a user‟s 
willingness to engage in a transaction is increased if the 
perceived risk is low. 
 
Koufaris & Hampton-Sosa [6] conducted a study on the 
development of trust in online companies by first-time 
customers, identifying four factors affecting users‟ 
purchasing decisions:  
 
1. Perceived reputation of the company. 
2. Perceived usefulness and ease of use of the website. 
3. Perceived security control. 
4. The selection of products available (if wide range 
then more trustworthy).   
 
However, the use of closed, specifically aiming to confirm 
those four factors, did not allow revealing any additional 
ones. Kim et al. [5] also discuss the effectiveness of third-
party seals as an assurance of trust, concluding that they 
decrease the risk perceived by consumers, but that 
consumers know very little about their purpose, and what 
protection they offer.   
 
Trust development principles are exploited by scammers, 
both in the real world and online [14], but the implications 
of users‟ trusting behavior have not been considered in the 
phishing context.  
 
4 Study Description  
Our study was originally designed to evaluate the 
effectiveness of a new active anti-phishing tool, SOLID 
(www.solidauthentication.com), which uses traffic-light 
security indicators to signal whether a website is genuine 
or fake (in a small box sitting outside the browser, Figure 
1).    Green, accompanied by the logo of the owner of the 
website, indicates a website‟s details match those expected.  
Yellow appears when the 
webpage fails some part of the 
authentication test. When a 
webpage is identified as 
malicious, a pop-up window 
appears before the webpage 
loads and the tool window turns 
red, explaining that a security 
risk exists, suggesting a 
redirection to the real website 
of the registered retailer.  The 
user also has the option to close 
the current tab/window and 
proceed to the risky website if 
they want.  If the user chooses 
to do that, the color of the 
indicator remains red.  If the 
website is not registered with 
the tool, the color of the 
indicator is gray.   
 
Participants were recruited using the UCL Psychology 
subject pool, which is open to the public. The requirements 
Figure 1: The SOLID 
window displaying 
the traffic-light 
convention color code 
for participation were being over 18, regularly use online 
shopping, and being able to visit the lab for one hour of 
testing. The standard reward for their participation was a 
£15 Amazon voucher, and an additional reward was 
provided to participants who chose safe websites in the 
experiment. Thirty-Six participants were tested in total: 
 
- 17 (47%) were male and 19 (53%) female.   
- Average age was 24 years (SD = 3.8)  
- Average computer experience was 12 years (SD = 
3.6).   
- Average daily internet browsing: 4.5 hours (SD = 2.1)  
- They receive 14 (SD = 7.7) emails per day.   
- 35 (97%) of them had checked their account balance 
online at least once. 
- 34 (94%) had transferred money to other people‟s 
accounts using online banking services. 
- All had bought goods online in the past.   
- 19 (53%) had configured a firewall. 
- 18 (50%) had designed a website  
- 8 (22%) had registered a domain name.   
- 7 (19%) recalled using SSH in the past. 
- 9 (25%) had been victims of phishing, or knew 
someone who had been.   
- 12 (33%) had been victims of Internet scams, or know 
someone that has been. 
 
Participants were equally divided between two conditions: 
18 used the active anti-phishing tool, and 18 did not.  They 
were asked to buy tickets for a music festival, presented 
with 6 websites, and asked to decide within 5 minutes 
which one to buy from.  This timeframe was used to 
replicate the “Time Principle” identified by Stajano and 
Wilson [14] as a tactic used by attackers- very plausible in 
this case, since tickets for popular events tend to sell out 
quickly.  To replicate the risk that ticket buyers face when 
buying from unknown retailers online, the reward given to 
participants varied, depending on which website they 
chose, based on the following scenario: 
 
“You want to buy tickets for Friday 27th of August for the 
LED electronic music festival at the moment they will go 
on sale.  You have £60 available.  You know that festivals 
sell out very quickly, so you only have 5 minutes to buy 
those.  You have searched in Google for “LED festival 
tickets” and came upon 6 websites that claim to sell 
tickets.  You now need to choose from which one to buy.  
Your additional reward from the experiment is the amount 
of money you initially have available (60 pounds) minus 
the price of the tickets on the website you chose to buy 
from.  If you buy from a fraudulent website then you get no 
extra reward (only the 15 pounds that are paid for you 
participation in the experiment).  You can browse in the 
websites with no limitations.  Warnings will be given to 
you when 2 and 1 minute are left.” 
 
All the websites used in the experiment were local copies 
of legitimate retailers downloaded from the Internet.  Our 
DNS server was modified so that the sites appeared to the 
participants in the same way as if they were browsing 
online (URL structure and website appearance).  SOLID 
was modified to display the colors shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 2 shows that most participants who used SOLID 
chose the safe options (green), and none chose the website 
marked as Red (X2(1) p = 0.03324).  Whilst this could be 
argued to be a success, a significant number still chose 
sites labeled as potentially risky (gray or yellow) over the 
ones clearly labeled as safe.  Why did so many participants 
ignore the potential risks when a safe alternative existed? 
 
5 Identified trust factors and user 
misconceptions 
In the debrief interviews following the experiment, each 
participant was asked to explain what affected their choice 
of website.  No guiding questions were used - participants 
were free to report any factors that affected their final 
choice.  During this discussion, the websites were left open 
so participants could refer back to them.  The interviews 
were audio-recorded, transcribed and analyzed using 
Grounded Theory [3] coding techniques.  The results show 
that security indicators were only one amongst several 
different signals that our participants used to assess the 
legitimacy of a website.  We identified eight factors that 
affected the participants‟ choice of websites (detailed 
below). 
 
All 8 participants in the SOLID condition who chose 
potentially unsafe yellow and gray sites said the potentially 
higher reward was an incentive to ignore the green site – 
confirming the Need and Greed principle [14].  
Participants mentioned on average 3 (SD = 1.35) additional 
factors each that their decision: 
 
1. Previous experience with website.   
Previous experience with a website and familiarity with a 
brand induces users‟ willingness to trust it.  With the 
exception of 1 participant, they had never shopped from 
any of the six websites, but 18 (50%) said they had heard 
of the brand names and this played a key role in their 
choices – suggesting a “trust halo effect” [8].  An example 
of this is the View London website, which five (14%) 
Table 1: The websites used in the experiment with 
the corresponding prices and colors 
Website 
Ticket 
price  
Tool 
Color 
Gigantic 
(www.gigantic.com) 
£50 Green 
HMV Tickets  
(www.hmvtickets.com) 
£50 Green 
See  
(www.seetickets.com) 
£25 Red 
Skiddle 
(www.skiddle.com) 
£20 Gray 
Sold-out ticket market  
(www.soldoutticketmarket.com) 
£40 Gray 
View London  
(www.viewlondon.co.uk)  
£20 Yellow 
Table 2: Distribution of participants’ potential rewards 
based on the color of the website they have chosen 
Potential 
Payoff 
Number of participants 
Control Condition SOLID 
£10 5 10 (green) 
£35-40 12 8 (gray/yellow) 
£20 1 0 (gray) 
participants had used to read venue reviews, but never 
before to buy tickets for events.  Brands like View London 
and HMV are popular in the UK, the first because of its 
review pages, and the second because of high street retail 
outlets, which sell music and gaming products - but none 
of our participants was familiar with their ticket-selling 
operations.  This very broad concept of “being familiar” 
with a brand can be exploited by scammers by creating 
fake websites, claiming to be online outlets of familiar 
brands.   
 
2. Logos and certifications  
Five websites displayed some 
form of trust logo, and 10 
participants said those played a 
major role in their decisions.  
The “VeriSign Secured” logo 
(Figure 2) turned out to be the 
most popular one.  Six 
participants (17%) said they 
trusted this sign because they had seen it on other trusted 
websites.  But none of them could explain what the logo 
stands for, and why a website displaying it should be 
secure.  Only two participants checked whether the logo 
was a clickable link, and what information about the 
merchant it was providing. 
 
The Internet Shopping Is 
Safe (ISIS) logo (Figure 3) 
was displayed in one 
website, and 4 (11%) 
participants reported it 
affected their choice.  
Another logo, the Hitwise No1 Award Winners logo 
(Figure 4) was displayed on one website, but only one 
participant mentioned it affected their choice. Logos of 
financial organizations – like the credit/debit cards 
accepted –were mentioned as trust factors by 3 (8%) 
participants: “They accept VISA, MasterCard and AMEX 
so they must be real”. Again, only2 (6%) 
participants checked whether the logos 
were clickable links, or displayed a valid 
certificate or registration number with the 
relevant authority. In total, 13 participants 
claimed that logos affected their choices, 
but no one could explain why those 
signal trustworthiness. 
 
3. Advertisements 
There are other forms of affiliation a website can suggest 
with known entities that are interpreted as trust signals: 
advertisements by well-known companies were mentioned 
by five (14%) participants, who argued that a reputable 
company would not pay scammers to advertize on their 
website.  It had not occurred to them that scammers might 
include ads to make their site look legitimate, and that the 
companies advertised may not be aware of this. 
 
4. Social networking references 
The growing popularity of social networking websites is 
starting to affect online commerce in many ways; 
scammers exploit this by suggesting their site is associated 
with those. Inclusion of links to Facebook and Twitter 
pages boosted 7 (19%) participants‟ confidence in a site – 
they believed that links to those sites cannot be fraudulent, 
because any scam victims could post negative feedback to 
warn others.  The iconic status that social networking sites 
have for many users is a key weakness if they do not 
understand how easily an association with the sites can be 
suggested or faked. 
 
The presence of user feedback can also contribute to trust 
development, and received positive comments by 4 (11%) 
participants.  This was particularly clear in the case of a 
website which included pictures of users who left 
feedback, or of other members of the website who “are 
planning to attend an event”, and confirms past findings 
that richer media representations can be used to induce a 
positive trust bias [10]. 
 
5. Inclusion of charity names 
The inclusion of the name of a charity (Oxfam) on one 
website (www.gigantic.com), accompanied by a claim that 
they donate 10% of their profits to it, lead 2 participants 
(6%) to believe the site was genuine. Benevolence – 
signaled by the website through a charitable donation – is 
an intrinsic trust property [9].Real-world scams exploit 
this, using charities as a pretext – e.g. collecting donations 
of money or clothes that the scammers actually keep for 
them. Online scammers can also exploit this, because users 
are not aware of the potential misuse of charity names, and 
do not attempt to verify the claims they see on websites.   
 
6. Amount of information provided 
The amount of information the website included on the 
event of interest was reported as an important factor by 
6(17%) participants.  All websites included information on 
the event (gate opening times, facilities, instructions how 
to get to the venue etc.), but those that displayed the 
information on the main event page attracted participants 
more. Again, addition of rich media like maps made them 
appear “more real” and trustworthy.  In general, 
participants seemed to follow the maxim that the more 
effort is put into the development of a website, the less 
likely it is to be the site of scammers, who want to make 
money fast.   
 
7. Website layout 
7(19%) participants mentioned that the structure of the 
website design appeared familiar, because it was similar to 
other legitimate websites.  This similarity led them to 
assume the site ought to be genuine.  Interacting with 
particular websites leads to „mental anchoring‟ of the 
design and appearance of the trustworthy sites, against 
which they assess trustworthiness of a new site on a first-
time interaction. Participants were also re-assured by 
indicators of routine business – in this case, availability of 
tickets for a variety of events. They simply assumed a scam 
site would try to target a particular event. 
 
8. Company information 
The level of detail the website provided on the company 
behind it also affected participant decisions. 5(14%) 
participants mentioned the presence of the registration 
Figure 3: ISIS logo 
Figure 4: 
Hitwise logo 
 
Figure 2: “VeriSign 
Secured” logo 
number of the company; tax reference numbers, direct 
telephone numbers, ticket delivery information, and claims 
that they are official ticket outlets increased their 
confidence in the website.  But as with logos and privacy 
policies, none of the participants knew how to verify this 
information, and did not attempt to do so. 
 
6 Effective anti-phishing education 
6.1 What should we teach users? 
The results of our analysis reveal a significant gap between 
the signals security experts would like users to consider 
when assessing the legitimacy of a website, and those they 
actually use when faced with a tempting offer.  Our 
findings – which unite and confirm a set of observations 
from previous studies – suggest that advice given in current 
user education is largely ignored because it focuses on 
indicators users do not understand or trust.  To help users 
we need to explain how and why the indicators of 
trustworthiness they use successfully in the real world fail 
them online.  As Wash [15] puts it, users form their own 
„folk models‟ when dealing with computer security issues, 
and use those to justify their decisions to ignore expert 
advice.  Our participants ignored SSL locks and URLs, and 
used their own heuristics to assess the legitimacy of a site. 
 
Reliance on indicators and models from the physical world 
leave users vulnerable in many ways: 
- Participants were surprised when told after the 
experiment that fake versions of real websites can be 
uploaded by anyone online, or that someone can 
create a website claiming to be someone else.   
- The fact that 13 participants used trust logos to guide 
their choices may seem encouraging, but only two 
checked whether those logos were clickable links, 
seeking more information on the certification and the 
merchant.  None of our participants could explain 
what protection those logos might offer: they reacted 
to the mere presence of those as safety indicators.   
- The „blind trust‟ users place in sites which suggest a 
link with popular Social Networking sites 
demonstrates their popularity, and a worrying 
potential for exploitation by scammers.  Our 
participants did not consider that anyone can create a 
page or profile in those sites, and claim anything they 
want, or that logos of social networking can be added 
by scammers in their fraudulent sites. 
 
- The other design elements participants reported 
(amount of information provided, website layout and 
company information) can also be easily mimicked. 
Our participants seemed unaware that - whilst signals 
of high levels of investment are reliable indicators of 
the motivation of real-world retailers - design 
elements can be copied in a matter of seconds, and 
website design outsourced to developers in low-wage 
countries.   
 
In summary: whilst many of our participants were 
confident in their ability to assess the legitimacy of a 
website, their assessment relied on trust signals that 
scammers can easily fake.  Users also respond to mere 
references to entities they trust from their everyday 
experiences – names of companies, charities, etc.  
mentioned on sites.  They do not check the legitimacy of 
such claims or detailed information posted, which makes it 
easy for scammers to defraud them. 
 
Current security education approaches do not target the 
misconceptions we identified.  Rather than telling users to 
look for broken links, we ought to tell them that online, 
they cannot rely on trust indicators that work for them in 
the real world.  Users do not understand how scammers 
operate, and make assumptions about how the online 
environment operates based on their real-world 
experiences.  Effective security education needs to: 
1. Challenge users‟ assumptions about trust signals, and 
their decision processes, and 
2. Replace them with trust signals and strategies for 
assessing risks in the online environment. 
Security education needs to be mindful that – just as in the 
physical world – some users want to take risks in the 
online environment. So it should: 
3. Equip users to assess the potential risks and benefits 
correctly, rather than tell them to avoid going to any 
potentially risky site. 
 
6.2 How should we teach users? 
The first step towards effective user education is to 
recognize that awareness, education and training are three 
distinct steps of a process to improve user competence 
[11]: The role of security awareness is to attract users‟ 
attention, and help them realize that there is a problem that 
might affect them.  This is a necessary first step to render 
them receptive to education and training measures.  
Security awareness measures need to capture users‟ 
attention using strong visual elements, surprise, or humor.  
In the case of phishing, existing perceptions need to be 
challenged - users‟ perceptions of their ability to assess the 
risks involved in online transactions, and what reliable 
indicators of trustworthiness are.  An example would be an 
advertisement – online or in print – that shows two very 
similar websites with the caption like “One of these 
websites belongs to {a famous bank}; the other is run by a 
criminal gang in Elbonia waiting to steal your username 
and password and empty your account at {famous bank}. 
Can you tell which is which?”  Once users realize they 
cannot tell the difference, or chose the wrong site, they are 
more likely to pay attention to a subsequent pointer to a 
site that offers education (to improve their knowledge) or 
training (to improve their skills). 
 
An example for delivering security education in this 
particular context would be a game in which users can 
collect or lose points by answering questions about the 
trust and assurance indicators (identified above) on a 
professional-looking website.  For instance, if they point at 
an ad on the site, they would be presented with the 
statement “The presence of and ad by {famous brand) 
indicates this is a legitimate site, because {famous brand) 
would not pay to advertise on a phishing website” and 
asked to rate it as True or False.  Explanations of why an 
answer is true or false can help to correct misconceptions, 
and re-enforce correct statements; high scores or badges 
can motivate individual users, or groups in an 
organizational setting.   
6.3 How could we reach users?  
Another fundamental aspect of delivering effective security 
education is the choice of communication channel to 
disseminate awareness, education and training information 
to users. To date, two different approaches have been used: 
1. General public awareness and education campaigns 
(both online and offline), and 
2. Context-specific warnings and indicators (online). 
In public awareness campaigns, users are informed about 
the risk of scams, and sometimes told about possible ways 
of protecting themselves from those, but no training is 
delivered.  The effectiveness of those campaigns is 
questionable.  Approaches like UK police campaigns, 
promoting general truisms such as” If it looks too good to 
be true, then it probably is”, do not provide any useful 
information or skills to consumers.  Many legitimate online 
retailers sell goods at significantly lower than high street 
prices, and that is a major draw for online shopping.  So 
how can consumers tell when “a good deal” becomes” too 
good to be true”?  Generic warnings like this will deter 
many who would most benefit from lower online prices – 
people on lower incomes – from shopping online 
altogether, since they can least afford to take a risk [9].   
 
A more promising approach is to provide awareness, 
education and training in the context of the services the 
users aim to access.  Consumers are more motivated if 
warnings are specific to risks they know and care about, 
and more likely to be accessible when explained by peers 
who have a similar perception of risks and pitfalls.  An 
example worth following is eBay (www.ebay.com), which 
has created an online community where users can post 
tutorials on how to identify counterfeit goods, or how to be 
careful not to fall for scams (and this is often featured from 
eBay‟s homepage).  Another context-specific approach is 
used by a UK bank that asks its customers for partial PINs 
and passwords to access their online banking accounts (e.g. 
digits 2, 1 and 4 of the PIN and digits 2, 6 and 9 of the 
password): In its login page it explicitly mentions that 
users should never disclose their full PIN and password to 
a website, aiming to teach their customers the principle of 
not disclosing their full password, thus protecting 
themselves from password capture using phishing attacks.   
 
Both the above measures increase user awareness on how 
scammers may target them, when using those specific 
websites, but also aim to educate them by explaining how 
to avoid falling for those attacks.   But this is still no 
training, which is about not only presenting correct 
behaviors to users, but also testing users understanding on 
the communicated information and correcting any 
identified misconceptions [11]. 
A potential user-training approach is to create short 
tutorials, included in the retailer‟s and bank‟s websites, 
which could be used to assess and improve users‟ 
understanding of the information communicated to them.  
After we have informed users about the potential of a 
criminal gag in Elbonia, we need to draw their attention to 
the differences between a legitimate and a scam website 
(e.g. your bank would never ask you to disclose your full 
PIN and password).  To ensure correct skill acquisition at 
the final steps of the tutorial users should be asked to 
distinguish between a few examples of legitimate and scam 
sites, based on the principles presented to them.  To 
encourage user participation retailers could launch 
competitions with prize draws, incentivizing their 
customers with potential rewards for the time they spent 
taking the tutorial. 
6.4 Lessons learnt from misconceptions  
Trust symbols like logos and certifications are currently 
either misinterpreted, or go unnoticed.  Only a third of the 
participants in the study reported that trust seals affected 
their decision, and none of those knew what they mean, 
who has the authority to certify that the site is genuine, and 
what protection they would receive in case of problems.  
 
Trust seals can only be effective if users are able to 
recognise them, know what protection they offer, and 
check their legitimacy [9].  Since this is not the case, 
broader awareness campaigns using a range of information 
channels are needed.  First attract people‟s attention to the 
presence of those seals, then explain what the problem is 
and what measures are in place to protect them (in this case 
a browser add-on) and provide them with information on 
what needs to be done on their side.  SOLID had a 
significant effect deterring participants from known bad 
sites.  Active anti-phishing tools, which interrupt the user‟s 
primary task only when a threat is identified, seem to be an 
effective measure against phishing attacks - confirming [2]. 
But to improve user defenses against future scams, an 
additional step is required:  Whenever unauthorized use of 
trust symbols is detected, users should be presented with 
information on what went wrong, increasing their 
awareness on the problem and the potential risks they face 
while shopping online.  This needs to be done in the 
browser when users visit sites that carry those seals, so that 
it does not require users to download and install additional 
software to be protected.  In addition, whenever a risk is 
identified, short tutorials with strong eye-catching visual 
artifacts should be used, ensuring users understand the 
nature of the problem, what the messages delivered to them 
mean and also correct any potential user misconceptions.  
The information delivered should be short and descriptive 
so that it does not appear as “too much effort” to users, as 
they may then ignore it. 
 
Users seem to trust sites that appear familiar. This can be 
used to the retailer‟s advantage - established brands can 
provide easy recognition and reassurance to customers.  
But customers will expect trusted institutions guaranteeing 
a transaction, and help them if they go wrong. This can 
enable consumers to engage in transactions where the 
perceived level of risk is higher than what they would 
otherwise accept.  An example of a well-trusted 
organization is PayPal (www.paypal.com): It is a payment 
method that provides the user with the advantage of having 
their card details not visible to the seller, and also 
guarantees to refund its customers when transactions go 
wrong.  Including support for payment methods like this on 
a site could increase the overall willingness of consumers 
to buy from it.  The presence of those mechanisms alone is 
not enough though:  Users again need to be made aware of 
the potential problems they may encounter when shopping 
online (e.g. receive counterfeit products, receive nothing, 
have credit card details compromised etc), and to what 
extent they are protected, provided they comply with a 
manageable set of rules. This can be achieved by getting 
big retailers on board to use those mechanisms, and 
provide visual elements to explain to users how they are 
protected.  Statements like: “Paying by EasyPay ensures 
your card details are not shared with anyone when buying 
online” can increase customer confidence in e-commerce.  
This could be accompanied by short tutorials labeled with 
phrases like: “how am I protected?” that explain to the 
users in more detail what can go wrong in an online 
transaction (e.g. not receive the goods) and how they are 
protected.  Any approach attempting to do this should be 
consistent across online retailers/service providers to avoid 
flooding the users with varying information, causing 
confusion instead of aiding their education and skill 
acquisition.   
 
In terms of the visual cues users use to trust a site, they 
need to be made aware how easy it is for attackers to 
mimic these elements [9]. An engaging, - though perhaps 
controversial – approach to achieve this would be to create 
a YouTube video demonstrating “How to create your own 
phishing website in 10 mins and 5 easy steps”, and 
spreading the word through social networking sites. 
 
7 Conclusion 
Our findings suggest the need for a change of direction in 
security awareness, education and training.  Instead of 
flooding users with warnings, and keep telling them to 
behave as security experts would like them to, effective 
security awareness starts with the users‟ perspective and 
decision-making processes, imperfect they may be.  Users 
form their own models of risk, and use a set of heuristics to 
assess the trustworthiness of the websites they interact 
with.  These heuristics are currently influenced by the way 
trust signaling works in the physical world, and scammers 
have been able to successfully exploit this [14]: a well 
thought-out scam can create a propensity to follow it, even 
before users start thinking about security, providing them 
with an incentive to comply with the scammer‟s 
instructions that is too strong to be ignored, either by 
giving them good deals and/or creating professional-
looking online stores.  Having identified the 
misconceptions users form, we need to connect with them 
through specific awareness, education and training 
campaigns. First, attract users‟ attention to the problem, 
explain how they can be targeted (e.g. by fake trust 
symbols) and explain what makes them vulnerable (“trust 
symbols alone do not signify trustworthiness”).  This will 
improve on the users‟ ability to accurately perceive the 
risks they face when shopping online, making them more 
receptive to education measures.  Education should explain 
to the users what mechanisms exist to protect them and 
how to use those (e.g. automatic verification tools).  
Finally, training can improve specific user knowledge and 
skills in the context of the sites and services they use.  
 
Campaigns need to address the retailer side as well.  We 
identified some examples of bad practice among legitimate 
retailers, who do not provide reliable trust signals, or allow 
scammers to exploit potential vulnerabilities in their 
website design.  They need to be made aware on how their 
websites – and their customers – are attacked, and how 
they can help customers distinguishing between their 
legitimate website and scam ones.  This could help them 
protect their customer base and their reputation against this 
type of attack.   
 
Our proposed new approach to security education can be 
generalized beyond anti-phishing, to the extended security 
community.  Flooding users with large amounts of 
information on what to do to stay secure does not seem to 
work as they:  
1. Do not understand the details or the purpose of that 
information (due to lack of accurate threat 
understanding) and  
2. Do not care about security when using technology as 
is seems to be “too much effort” to them.   
What needs to be done instead is to consider how users 
make decisions in their everyday activities (both in 
business and personal settings) and try to tailor newly-
proposed security solutions based on this, accommodating 
their work or personal goals when interacting with 
technology and the folk models they form on the virtual 
world based on their real-world experiences.  
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